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Modern cyber operations require operators to maintain supervisory control of remote 
computer agents. A current operational concern is the number of agents an operator can 
control at once. This issue resonates with similar “span-of-control” research conducted in 
UAV operations (e.g., Cummings & Mitchel, 2008). One way to identify operator span is 
via “fan-out,” a numeric calculation that provides a span-of-control estimate based on 
system and environmental variables. However, fan-out is a mechanical representation that 
only accounts for task-characteristics and environmental variables, thus providing an 
upper bound of human performance that does account for cognition, workload, or work 
interruptions. The present study compares fan-out estimates against actual human 
performance in a supervisory control cyber task. Results are discussed and future 
research trajectories proposed.  
 
Over the last decade, cyber security has become a primary concern for homeland security. This 
concern is only likely to grow as we continue to develop technologies that employ computer networks to 
manage our major private (e.g., banking) and government (e.g., nuclear power plant) assets. 
Traditionally, cyber security research focuses mostly on computer science and engineering 
problems, such as the development of algorithms and systems to detect, identify, and mitigate specific 
threats that exist on computer networks. While this research is critical to our national defense, it does not 
acknowledge the critical role that human operators play in cyber security. Recently, the Human Factors 
community has recognized this critical research gap and in response has started an initiative to explore 
human-centered aspects of cyber operations. Current research has focused on identifying important 
dimensions of cognition within cyber operations, such as situation awareness (Giacobe, 2012), team 
knowledge structures (Mancuso & McNeese, 2012), and team collaboration (Rajivan et al, 2013). 
However, little research has focused explicitly on specific issues related to task load and individual 
operations management. 
Current cyber operations exist within a complex system of human-machine interaction, where 
operators are tasked with monitoring the activities, efficacy, and progress of intelligent and autonomous 
computer systems (Tyworth et al., 2013). In these environments, cyber operators supervise intelligent 
systems as they execute tasks across the network. This task places significant cognitive demand on 
operators due to the need to maintain situation awareness while dividing attention across a set of dynamic 
tasks and managing a deluge of information. While novel within the context of human-centered cyber 
research, these environments share many commonalities with human supervisory control tasks.  
 In Human Supervisory Control (HSC) tasks, a human-in-the-loop provides an autonomous asset 
with high-level plans, instructions, and goal directives (Miller, 2004). In operations such as Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), a task that is currently performed using manual control but will likely shift to 
HSC (at least partially) in next-gen operations, researchers have examined human performance in HSC 
simulations to improve system design, mitigate operator workload, account for individual differences, and 
identify/optimize human span-of-control. However, similar research has not been conducted on cyber 
operations despite that fact that current-gen work environments often involve HSC tasks.  
 Based on this, the purpose of this research was to conduct a preliminary exploration of the 
translation of previous HSC research to cyber operations. Specifically, in this paper we perform an 
experimental evaluation of the predictive span-of-control metric known as “fan-out.” To assess fan-out’s 
 
 
 
 
potential application for cyber-operations, we will compare fan-out estimates against observed human 
performance in a cyber supervisory control task that requires human operators to control multiple 
automated agents across a simulated area network. 
 
Fan-Out 
Nehme et al. (2008) and Cummings & Mitchel (2008) developed a work-flow model of HSC 
tasks that parse performance into three components: service time, productive time, and wait time. Service 
time, also known as interaction time (IT) is the amount of time that it takes a human to service an 
autonomous asset. This value includes the amount of time it takes an operator to allocate the asset, 
determine the necessary inputs, and expresses those inputs to the asset via the interface (Olsen & 
Goodrich, 2003). Next, productive time, also known as neglect time (NT), represents the average amount 
of time an asset can operate without an operator’s intervention (Olsen & Goodrich, 2003). Finally, wait 
time (WT) is the amount of time that an asset spends in the queue waiting to be serviced by the human. 
Maximum efficiency can be achieved by minimizing service and wait times, while maximizing 
productive time.  
To help improve HSC systems for maximal performance, some of the variables mentioned above 
are combined to obtain computational estimates of fan-out (FO) according to the equation, FO = (NT / IT) 
+1 (Dixon, Wickens & Chang, 2005; Miller, 2004; Olsen & Goodrich, 2003; Sheridan, 1992). From a 
linear throughput perspective, FO indicates the number of homogenous assets a single operator can 
control at once without interference or drag (Olsen & Wood, 2004). Thus, FO can (and has been) used as 
a theoretical upper bound for estimates of operator span-of-control. For example, Cummings & Mitchell 
(2008) found that operators performed at approximately 36% below fan-out estimates in a UAV 
simulation and speculated three reasons for sub-optimal performance: a) WT in the human decision-
making queue (WTQ), b) interaction wait time (WTI), and c) wait time due to loss of situation awareness 
(WTSA). WTQ occurs when an asset goes unattended while an operator completes their decision making 
task. WTI, which is very similar to IT, includes time that the operator spends determining the appropriate 
action and communicating it to the asset. Finally, WTSA includes time that the operator spends away 
from the asset as they perceive elements in the environment, comprehends their meanings and makes 
future predictions of their status. While conceptually quite simple, capturing these metrics for the purpose 
of predicting human span of control in a computational model can be quite complex, especially WTQ and 
WTSA.  
Based on such evidence, we expected that, assuming accurate inputs, that estimates of FO in a 
cyber HSC simulation (BotNET Operator Ratio Determination; BOARD v1.5) would correlate with 
human span-of-control. However, due to the inherent complexity of cyber-operations, we also expected 
that actual span-of-control will be significantly lower than the estimates generated by the fan-out equation. 
Together, these finds would allow us to pinpoint the theoretical and realistic span-of-control for HSC 
cyber operations. 
 
Methods 
 
Simulated Task Environment 
BOARD is a human-in-the-loop scaled world simulation that is set in the context of cyber 
supervisory control operations. In this simulation, participants are tasked with remotely controlling 
computer agents using a command line interface. During the tasks, participants interact with three main 
components: a) the agent control window, b) the agent beacon monitor, and c) the mission commander 
messaging system (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The BOARD simulation user interface depicting the agent control window (a), the agent beacon monitor (b), and the 
mission commander messaging system(c) 
These interface elements allow participants to remotely control computer agents using a set list of 
commands, monitor the progress and state of varying missions, and communicate with a mission 
commander to obtain permission to execute restricted commands. 
At the start of each experimental trial of BOARD performed in this experiment, participants 
received an Operating Tasking Order (OTO) print out and were given access to a set of computer agents. 
Each OTO comprised a mission set, where missions within the set were characterized by an assigned 
“agent type” and three steps that must be accomplished (in serial order) to successfully complete the 
mission (see Table 1 for an example). In each mission step, participants were provided with a command 
they must execute and an authorization code to run the command. In order to complete the mission, the 
participant needed complete all three steps in order, using an agent of the correct type. If they enter the 
incorrect authorization code, the command may not execute and they cannot complete the mission. 
 
Table 1.  
Example BOARD Operating Tasking Orders. 
 Type Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
1 Delta getlog "yxdembfl" grab "xtizjluw" phish "sblukllp" 
2 Sigma getlog "hlhsggwg" rename "lgxustfx" bl_url "rahtdkcl" 
3 Delta bc_add "hihhohwv" bc_add "upfyvedo" rexec 
 
In some cases, authorization codes were not provided to participants (e.g. Mission 3, Step 3 in 
Table 1). In these instances, the participant was forced to utilize the Mission Commander Messaging 
system to request an authorization code. This manipulation was included to represent cyber rules of 
engagement, which require command authorization before executing sensitive missions. After requesting 
the code, the mission commander responded with an authorization code in a variable amount of time 
(between 10 and 60 seconds). While participants waited for authorization, they were permitted to move 
on and complete other missions (but not subsequent steps in the same mission). 
 
Measures 
In this study, fan-out measures were customized for each participant from typing ability and 
average response time for agents during a pre-experiment simulation. Prior to the experimental task, each 
participant was asked to complete a typing test lasting two minutes. Words-per-minute results were 
adjusted based on errors, and then multiplied by 5 to calculate estimated characters per minute (CPM; 
 
 
 
 
Arif & Stuezlinger, 2009). Using the equation proposed by Olsen & Goodrich (2003), IT was calculated 
by comparing the CPM to the average character length of agent execution commands (37 characters) and 
NT was calculated from the average time it took an agent to execute a command (45 seconds). 
Observed operator span-of-control was calculated as the maximum number of agents operating in 
a one-minute window averaged across each 20 minute trial. 
 
Participants 
Twenty-one participants (17 Male, 4 Female), drawn from local universities and United States 
Air-Force agencies, were financially compensated for their participation (on-duty Airmen received no 
compensation outside of their regular duty pay). All participants were between the ages of 19 and 45 (M = 
23.95, SD = 5.15) and had some level of experience with Command Line Interfaces (CLI) and/or 
computer programming languages. Four participants had previous cyber security experience (classes, 
professional experience, etc.). 
 
Procedures 
Experimental sessions were conducted in the AFRL Cyber Integrated Performance and Human 
Effectiveness Research (CIPHER) Laboratory. Prior to the task, participants completed three phases of 
training. First participants completed a short self-paced computer based training (CBT) which took 
approximately 15 minutes. Following CBT, the researcher guided the participant through a short practice 
scenario using the BOARD environment to familiarize themselves with the computer interface, task 
requirements, and rule. Following the guided training scenario, participants were instructed to complete a 
second training scenario independently, while the researcher observed their progress and corrected any 
mistakes that were made. After the participant had reached satisfactory performance on the independent 
training scenario, participants completed four experimental trials, each lasting 20 minute. During each 
trial, participants were provided a different number of autonomous agents (4, 8, 12 or 16) with which to 
complete their assigned missions. These manipulations were part of a larger investigation and are 
peripheral to the central question of the current study (i.e., evaluation of the accuracy of fan-out measures 
in cyber). As such, results pertaining to their effects on performance are being prepared for presentation 
elsewhere. Estimates of operator span-of-control presented herein are means calculated across the four 
scenarios. The total duration of the experiment was approximately 3 hours. 
 
Results 
 
Fan out estimations were calculated for each individual based on their typing speed (cpm; M = 
264.29, SD = 70.33) and the average NT (45 seconds). Results showed no significant correlations 
between fan-out estimates and actual span-of-control, r = 0.19, p > .05 (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Participants Span-of-Control compared to Fan-Out Estimates 
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However, consistent with prior research, fan out estimates were found to be significantly higher 
than the actual span of control. A paired sample t-test revealed a significant difference between the 
predicted fan-out values (M = 7.43, SD = 1.99) and average span-of-control (M = 2.27, SD = 0.49), t = 
12.70, p < 0.05. 
 
Discussion 
 
Previous research has presented fan-out as a model upper bound of human span-of-control in 
several HSC tasks (Crandall & Cummings, 2003). While it is to be expected that actual span-of-control 
will fall below this value, generally these metrics have been found to be somewhat correlated (Cummings 
& Mitchell, 2008). Surprisingly, we found that fan-out estimates were not significantly correlated with 
observed span-of-control in the BOARD cyber HSC simulation. However, we did find a consistent 
difference between the predicted values (via fan-out) and observed span-of-control. Given that observed 
span-of-control fell well below the estimates (close to a 100% difference, as compared to the 30-50% 
difference presented in other HSC tasks, e.g., Cummings & Mitchell, 2008), the current results suggest 
that the inherent complexity of  cyber operations entails a higher cognitive load, reducing operator span 
well below fan-out estimates. 
One caveat of these findings, however, is that fan-out was calculated from a relatively simplistic 
formulation proposed by Cummings & Guerlain (2004); other researchers have proposed more complex 
approximations. In their research, Mitchell, Cummings and Sheridan (2003) proposed the addition of wait 
times to the denominator of the equation. In their expanded formula, wait time is a combination of the 
time the asset spends in the queue before receiving instructions from the operator and time attributed to 
operator reorientation and activities supporting situation awareness. Another interpretation by Crandall 
and colleagues (2005) utilizes other metrics, such as neglect and interaction impact, to calculate an overall 
performance metric for each asset based on all possible values for interaction and neglect time.  
 
Conclusion 
Building from previous HSC research, the purpose of this study was to investigate how the metric 
of fan-out translated to cyber operations. Using a simulated autonomous agent control task, we evaluated 
participants’ actual span-of-control, and compared them to the estimates calculated by a popular 
interpretation of the fan-out equation. Our findings indicated that fan-out did not provide an accurate 
representation of human performance in our task. Future research should focus on identifying the 
cognitive requirements of cyber work, so that more mature equations for predicting span of control can be 
developed.  
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